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Robert Max Williams
April 20, 2021
As AI technologies increase in capability and ubiquity, AI accidents are
becoming more common. Based on normal accident theory, high reliability
theory, and open systems theory, we create a framework for understanding
the risks associated with AI applications. In addition, we also use AI safety
principles to quantify the unique risks of increased intelligence and human-like
qualities in AI. Together, these two fields give a more complete picture of the
risks of contemporary AI. By focusing on system properties near accidents
instead of seeking a root cause of accidents, we identify where attention should
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1 Introduction
With current AI technologies, harm done by AIs is limited to power that we put
directly in their control. As said in [59], “For Narrow AIs, safety failures are at the
same level of importance as in general cybersecurity, but for AGI it is fundamentally
different.” Despite AGI (artificial general intelligence) still being well out of reach, the
nature of AI catastrophes has already changed in the past two decades. Automated
systems are now not only malfunctioning in isolation, they are interacting with humans
and with each other in real time. This shift has made traditional systems analysis
more difficult, as AI has more complexity and autonomy than software has before.
In response to this, we analyze how risks associated with complex control systems
have been managed historically and the patterns in contemporary AI failures to what
kinds of risks are created from the operation of any AI system. We present a framework
for analyzing AI systems before they fail to understand how they change the risk
landscape of the systems they are embedded in, based on conventional system analysis
and open systems theory as well as AI safety principles.
Finally, we present suggested measures that should be taken based on an AI
system’s properties. Several case studies from different domains are given as examples




As computer control systems increased in complexity in the 70’s and 80’s, unexpected
and sometimes catastrophic behaviour would emerge from previously stable systems [2].
While linear control systems (for example, a thermostat) had been used for some time
without unexpected behaviour, adaptive control systems created novel and unexpected
problems, such as “bursting”. As described in [2], bursting is the phenomenon
where a stable controller would function as expected for a long time before bursting
into oscillation, then returning to a stable state. This is caused by the adaptive
controller not having a rich enough input during the stable period to determine the
unknown coefficients of its model correctly, causing the coefficients to drift. Once the
system enters oscillation, the signal again becomes rich enough for the controller to
correctly estimate the unknown coefficients and the system becomes stable again. The
increased complexity of the more advanced technology (dynamic controller instead
of a static controller) introduced a dynamic not present in previous technologies,
and incomprehensible to an operator not familiar with this behavior. Worse, since
this behavior only happens when the controller is controlling the real world plant,
designers had no way of predicting this failure mode. Bursting can be reduced using
specifically engineered safety measures or more complex controllers (which bring even
more confounding problems), but still demonstrates that increases in complexity tends
to increase risk.
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2.2 Normal Accident Theory
One of the principal values of
‘normal accident’ analysis and
case descriptions is that it helps
to develop convincing materials
to counter the naive, perhaps
wistful or short-sighted, views of
decision-makers who, due to
institutional pressure,
desperation or arrogance, are
temped to make unrealistic
assumptions about the systems
they direct but for which they
have only nominal operational
responsibility.
Todd R. La Porte [31]
Risk of failure is a property inherent to complex systems, and complex systems are
inherently hazardous [15]. At a large enough scale, any system will produce “normal
accidents”. These are unavoidable accidents caused by a combination of complexity,
coupling between components, and potential harm. A normal accident is different
from more common component failure accidents in that the events and interactions
leading to normal accident are not comprehensible to the operators of the system [42].
Increasing the complexity and broadening the role of AI components in a system
decreases comprehensibility of the system, leading to an increase in normal accidents.
In 1984, Charles Perrow published “Normal Accidents” [42] which laid the groundwork
for NAT (normal accident theory). Under NAT, any system that is tightly coupled and
complexly interactive will inevitably experience a system accident. Decentralization
reduces coupling and increases complexity, while centralization decreases complexity
but also increases coupling. Thus, since an organization cannot be both centralized
and decentralized, large organizations will harbor system properties that make them
prone to normal accidents.
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2.3 High Reliability Theory
High reliability theory was developed to explain the incredible ability of certain
organizations to function without major accidents for long periods of time. In [56],
Weick identifies several common traits shared by high reliability organizations (HROs):
a strategic prioritization of safety, careful attention to design and procedures, redundancy,
decentralized decision making, continuous training often through simulation, strong
cultures that encourage vigilance and responsiveness to potential accidents, and a
limited degree of trial-and-error learning.
High reliability organizations manage the apparent paradox proposed in normal
accident theory by having traits of both centralization and decentralization. Decision
making is decentralized, allowing for decoupling, while policy and cultural factors are
highly centralized, allowing for the unification of goals and attention to safety. This
ability to be simultaneously centralized and decentralized through common culture
and goals is present not only in HROs but in collectivist cultures, demonstrated by
the tendency of members of these cultures to cooperate in social dilemmas [40] [25].
2.4 NAT-HRT Reconciliation
Normal accident theory holds that for industries with certain system properties, system
accidents are inevitable. Meanwhile, high reliability theory makes the observation that
there are many exceptions to this, and there are common traits shared by these HROs
that can be studied and understood as indicators of reliability. In [48], Shrivastava
et al. analyze how the two theories appear to be in conflict then reconcile them
by looking at how debates between the two sides neglect the importance of time in
understanding accidents.
Normal accident theory states that a system has to choose to trade off between
centralization (which allows for organization-aligned action and less chaos) and
decentralization (which enables operators to quickly make decisions). High reliability
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theory considers that it is possible to escape this apparent paradox by allowing
operators a high level of autonomy (decentralized decision making) while also putting
a focus on cultural aspects that improve safety and reliability (centralized goals).
Shrivastava et al. use the Swiss cheese model (SCM) to explain the importance
of time in the occurrence of accidents, even in systems that are stable over time.
In the SCM, the layers of safety are modeled as slices of cheese with holes in them
representing weak points in each layer of safety. Over time, holes change shape and
move around. Eventually, no matter how many slices of cheese (layers of safety) there
are, the holes will align allowing a straight shot through all of the slices of cheese (an
accident occurs) [39]. However, the SCM model only demonstrates that accidents are
inevitable, and “inevitability is immaterial for practical purposes” as Shrivastava et
al. state, since the time scales involved for some systems may be far longer than the
system is expected to operate.
Disaster incubation theory (DIT) is introduced as the final piece needed to reconcile
normal accident theory and high reliability theory. DIT describes how organizations
gradually migrate to the boundary of acceptable behavior, as good safety records drive
up complacency and deviance is normalized [54] [44]. DIT was considered only useful
in hindsight by proponents of NAT, so Snook [49] investigated accidents with this in
mind and created the framing of “practical drift”. This is the “slow steady uncoupling
of local practice from written procedure” [49] which leads an initially highly coupled
system to become uncoupled as operators and managers optimize their processes to
be more efficient, deviating from procedure. Then, if the system is required to become
tightly coupled again, the operators are ill-prepared for this increase in coupling and
a system accident can occur.
Through the lens of disaster incubation theory and practical drift, Shrivastava et al.
explain how NAT and HRT work to compliment each other to explain how accidents
take place and are avoided. The time period being considered by HRT takes place
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while the system is still a high reliability organization. The culture and procedures put
in place are working correctly, coupling is high, and complexity is manageable to the
well trained operators. Over time, however, practical drift decouples the system and
reliability decreases. If the organization is a high reliability organization, degradation
is limited and incidents can still be managed. Accidents that take place during this
period of time are within the scope of HRT. However, there is the possibility for an
unlikely event to lead from this steady decline of reliability to a normal accident.
If the system suddenly has to become more coupled (for instance, during a special
mission or to react to an incident breaking down multiple layers of safety), it is ill
prepared to do so. At this point, NAT’s trade-off between coupling and complexity
becomes important, and the perceived complexity of the system increases drastically,
making safe operation impossible, leading to a normal accident. This can only happen
after a great decrease in coupling from the initial (designed) state of the system, so
proponents of HRT would say that the accident was only able to take place due to
the system no longer acting as a high reliability organization.
High reliability theory explains how organizations resist practical drift, and the
accidents that happen when practical drift leads to a breakdown of high reliability
practices. Normal accident theory is useful when practical drift has lead to a great
degree of decoupling, then a sudden change in situation (which may be an intentional
operation or an unexpected incident) requires increased coupling, which the system is
(surprisingly, to operators) no longer able to handle without increasing complexity
beyond manageable levels.
2.5 Lethal Autonomous Weaponry
The introduction of lethal autonomous weaponry [12] increases the danger of normal
accidents not because it provides new kinds of failure or novel technologies but because
of the drastically increased potential harm. A machine which kills when functioning
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correctly is much more dangerous in an accident than one which only does harm
when malfunctioning. By increasing the level of complexity and autonomy of weapons
systems, normal accidents involving powerful weapons becomes a possibility.
2.6 Robustness Issues for Learned Agents
In [53], Uesato et al. train a reinforcement learner in an environment with adversarial
perturbations instead of random perturbations. Using adversarial perturbations,
failure modes that would be extremely unlikely to be encountered otherwise were
detected and integrated into training. This shows that AI trained to be “robust” by
training in a noisy environment may still have catastrophic failure modes that are not
observed during training, which can spontaneously occur after deployment in the real
world. Adversarial training is a tool to uncover and improve these issues. However, it
is only an engineered safety measure over the deeper issue of black box AI, which are
not characterized of their entire input space.
Image classifiers famously fail when faced with images that have been modified
by as little as one pixel [51], called adversarial examples. Despite performing well
on training data, test data, and even data from other datasets, image classifiers can
be made to reliably misclassify images by changing the images so slightly that the
alterations are invisible to the casual observer. In [27], Ilyas et al. argue that these
misclassifications are not due to a simple vulnerability, but due to image classifiers’
reliance on non-robust features. These are features which are not apparent to the
human eye but can be used to accurately classify images, even those outside of the
original dataset. Non-robust features are transferable to other datasets and the real
world. However, they are also invisible to the human eye and can be altered without
noticeably changing the appearance of the image. Classifiers with only robust features
can be created through robust training [36], but they suffer from decreased accuracy.
Thus, non-robust features are a useful mechanism to achieve high accuracy, at the
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cost of vulnerability to adversarial attacks.
The difference between robust and non-robust features is strictly human-centric.
Ilyas et al. frame this as an alignment problem. While humans and image classifiers
are superficially performing the same task, the image classifiers are doing it in a way
the is incomprehensible to humans, and can fail in unexpected ways. The misalignment
between the objective learned from the dataset and the human notion of an image
belong to any particular class is the underlying cause for the effectiveness of adversarial
examples.
This is a useful framing for other domains as well. A reinforcement learner achieving
impossibly high scores by hacking its environment doesn’t “know” that it’s breaking
the rules — it is simply doing what was specified, and incredibly well. Just as a
robust classifier loses some accuracy from being disallowed non-robust features, a
reinforcement learner that is prevented from reward hacking will always obtain a
lower reward. This is because while the designer’s goal is to create a useful agent,
the agent’s goal is to maximize reward. These two are always misaligned, a problem
referred to as the alignment problem [52].
2.7 Examples of AI Failures
Large collections of AI failures and systems to categorize them have been created
before [59] [47]. In [47], the classification schema details failures by problem source (such
as design flaws, misuse, equipment malfunction, etc.), consequences (physical, mental,
emotional, financial, social, or cultural), scale of consequences (individual, corporation,
or community), and agency (accidental, negligent, innocuous, or malicious). It also
includes preventability and software development life-cycle stage.
The AI Failures Incident Database provides a publicly accessible view of AI
failures [38]. There are 92 unique incidents the have been reported into it. A review
of the agency (cause) of each one is not listed on the website, so we give an overview
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here. Of the 92 incidents, 8 have some degree of malicious intent. Three are cases
where social media users or creators manipulated AI to show inappropriate content or
cause bots to produce hate speech. Two are incidents of hacking: spoofing biometrics
and stealing Etherium cryptocurrency. One is the use of AI generated video and audio
to misrepresent a public official. The last two are the only cases where AI could be
seen as a malicious agent. In one case, video game AI exploited a bug in the game to
overpower human players. In another, bots created to edit Wikipedia competed in a
proxy war making competing edits, expressing the competing desires of their human
creators. If these examples are representative, then a majority of AI incidents happen
by accident, while less than 10% are the result of malicious intent. The 2 examples
of AI malicious intent intent can be ascribed to AI given goals which put them in
opposition of others: countering edits in one case, and waging warfare (within a video
game) in the other.
2.8 Societal Impact of AI
The proliferation of AI technologies has impacts in our socioeconomic systems and
environment in complicated ways, both positive and negative [29]. AI has the ability to
make life better for everyone but also to negatively impact many by displacing workers
and increasing wealth disparity [22]. This is just one example of AI interacting with a
complicated system (in this case, the job market) to have large scale consequences.
While the effects of AI technologies on society and culture are outside of the scope of
this paper, we expect that AI will continue to increase in ubiquity and with it the
increased chance for large scale AI accidents.
2.9 Engineered Interpretability Measures
In [39], Nushi et al. present Pandora, a state of the art image captioning system with
novel interpretability features. It clusters its inputs, and predicts modes of failure
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based on latent features. The image captioning system is broken down into three
parts, the object detector, the language model, and the caption reranker. Pandora is
able to predict error types based on the inputs to each of these models as well as the
interactions between small errors in each part of the system accumulating to a failure.
This feature is of particular interest, as it is a step towards improved interpretability
for complex systems. Pandora is remarkable for creating explanations for a black-box
model (an artificial neural network) by training a trivially interpretable model (a
decision tree) on the same inputs with failure modes as its output.
In [16], Das et al. present an explanation generating module for a simulated
household robot. A sequence-to-sequence model translates the robot’s failure state to
a natural language explanation of the failure and why it happened. Their results are
promising — the explanations are generated reliably (∼90% accuracy) and the model
only makes mistakes within closely related categories. The generated explanations
improve the accuracy of an inexperienced user for correcting the failure, especially
when the explanation contains the context of the failure. For example, instead of the
robot stating only “Could not move its arm to the desired object.”, it also gives a
reason: “Could not move its arm to the desired object because the desired object is
too far away.”
Both of these papers offer major contributions to making AI components and
systems comprised of them safer and more understandable. However, measurement
mechanisms can create even greater degrees of confusion when they fail, and can
delay or confound the diagnosis of a situation. When two pressure gauges were giving
conflicting information at the Three Mile Island accident [42, p. 25], they increased
confusion instead of providing information. An AI which says nothing except that a
malfunction has occurred is easier to fix than one that gives misleading information.
If the accuracy is high enough, if the explanations are bounded for how incorrect they
can be, or if the operator knows to second-guess the AI, then the risks created by
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an explanation system are limited. The utility of providing explanations of failures,
as demonstrated in [16], is a compelling reason to add interpretability components
despite the additional complexity and unique risks they create. Further study into
real world applications of these systems is needed to understand the pros and cons of
implementing them.
2.10 Faulty Post-hoc Explanations in Humans
Experiments done on split-brain patients [19] show that the left hemisphere of the
brain will generate incorrect explanations for the right hemisphere’s actions with high
confidence when the same information is not available to both hemispheres. This
indicates that explainability is not a function of general intelligence but instead an
additional module the has evolved in the human brain, likely as a mechanism to
facilitate social cooperation [23]. Thus we should be skeptical of plausible sounding
explanations generated by AI, as humans provide a model for generating plausible
but incorrect explanations, which obscure the hidden information that explanations
are meant to express.
2.11 The AI Accident Network
Attributing fault is difficult when AI does something illegal or harmful. Punishing
the AI or putting it in jail would be meaningless, as our current level of AI lacks
personhood. Even if trying an AI for crimes was deemed meaningful, traditional
punishment mechanisms could fail in complex ways [10]. Instead, the blame must
fall on some human or corporate actor. This is difficult because the number of
parties responsible for the eventual deployment of the AI into the world could be
large: the owner of the AI, the operator, the manufacturer, the designer, and so on.
Lior [34] approaches this problem from a variety of legal perspectives and uses a
network model of all involved agents to find the party liable for damages caused by
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an AI. A compelling anecdote introduces the problem: a child is injured by a security
robot at a mall. Who is liable for the child’s injuries? Lior frames liability from the
paradigm of “nonreciprocal risk” which states that “[if] the defendant has generated a
‘disproportionate, excessive risk of harm, relative to the victim’s risk-creating activity’,
she will be found liable under this approach.”
Lior argues against other definitions of liability and that nonreciprocal risk is the
best way to determine liability in the context of AI accidents. Lior then describes how
the importance of different agents in an accident can be understood using network
theory. By arranging the victims, AI, and responsible or related parties into a network,
network theory heuristics can be used to locate parties liable for damages. These
heuristics include the degree of a node (its number of connections), measures of
centrality of a node in the network, and others.
As AI technologies are proliferated, AI accidents are happening not only in
commercial settings (where damages are internal to the corporation and assigning
blame is an internal matter) but in public settings as well. Robots causing injuries to
visitors and autonomous vehicles being involved in crashes are both novel examples of
this. For companies planning on using AI in externally deployed products and services,
understanding how AI liability is going to be treated legally is crucial to properly
managing the financial and ethical risks of deployment.
2.12 AI Safety
The field of AI safety focuses on long-term risks associated with the creation of
AGI (artificial general intelligence). The landmark paper “Concrete Problems in
AI Safety” [1] identifies the following problems for current and future AI: avoiding
negative side effects, avoiding reward hacking, scalable oversight, safe exploration,
and robustness to distributional change. Other topics identified as requiring research
priority by other authors include containment [4], reliability, error tolerance, value
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specification [50] [20], and superintelligence [8] [9]. These topics are all closely related
and could all be considered an instance of the “Do What I Mean” directive [61]. We
will explore the five topics from [1] with examples of failures and preventative measures
where applicable.
2.12.1 Avoiding Negative Side Effects
This problem has to do with things that are done by accident or indifference by the AI.
A cleaning robot knocking over a vase is one example of this. Complex environments
have so many kinds of “vases” that we are unlikely to be able to program in a penalty
for all side effects [1]. A suite of simulated environments for testing AI safety, the AI
Safety Gridworlds, includes a task of moving from one location to another without
putting the environment in an irreversible state [33]. Safe agents which avoid side
effects should prefer to avoid this irreversible state. To be able to avoid negative
side effects, an agent has to understand the value of everything in its environment in
relation to the importance of its objective, even things that the reward function is
implicitly indifferent towards. Knocking over a vase is acceptable when trying to save
someone’s life, for example, but knocking over an inhabited building is not. Many
ethical dilemmas encountered by people are concerned with weighing the importance
of various side effects, such as environmental pollution from industrial activity and
animal suffering from farming. This is a non-trivial problem even for humans [28].
However, using “common sense” to avoid damaging the environment while carrying
out ordinary tasks is a realistic and practical goal with our current AI technologies.
Inverse reward design, which treats the given reward function as incomplete, is able to
avoid negative side effects to some degree [20], showing that making practical progress
in this direction is achievable.
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2.12.2 Avoiding Reward Hacking
Most AI systems designed today contain some form of reward function to be optimized.
Unless designed with safety measures to prevent reward hacking, the AI can find
ways to increase the reward signal without completing the objective. These might
be benign, such as using a bug in the program to set the reward to an otherwise
unattainably high value [13], complicated such as learning to fall over instead of
learning to walk [32], or dangerous, such as coercing human engineers to increase its
reward signal by threatening violence or mindcrime [9].
Agents that wish to hack their rewards can do so by breaking out of their containers,
whether they are within simple training environments or carefully engineered prisons
with defenses in depth [4]. When researching a novel AI technology that has a risk of
creating AGI, researchers must use safety measures to prevent potential AGI from
escaping confinement. This is not common practice as AI today are not believed to be
capable of escaping the simulations they are tested in. However, humans and AI have
both broken confinement in games that are used to benchmark AI. In 2018, an AI
designed to maximize the score in a video game instead performed a series of seemingly
random actions which caused the score to increase rapidly without continuing to
progress in the game [13]. In this example, the AI is supposed to be using the game
controller output to move the character around the screen to play the game and
maximize the score, but it instead learned to hack the game and obtain a much higher
score than is conventionally possible. Through an exploit in the game’s programming
the AI managed to directly modify its score instead of taking actions within the
simulation as expected. In 2014, an exploit in Super Mario World was used to modify
memory and jump directly to the end screen of the game a few minutes into play.
This also demonstrates an agent (in this case, a computer assisted human) breaking a
level of containment through a sophisticated attack.
In light of these examples, it is possible to gain arbitrary code execution abilities
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from within a sandboxed game environment and these kinds of exploits may be present
inside any program which is meant to limit the output space of an AI. Virtual machines,
often used as an additional layer of security, are also susceptible to a wide range of
exploits [45]. This illustrates a more general concern which is the AI acting outside of
the output space that it was designed to work with, seen in many of the AI failures
in [59].
Adversarial reward functions, where the reward function is learned and has a
competing objective with the AI, can decrease reward hacking [17]. Another mitigation
strategy is the use of tripwires. For instance, if the AI gets a much higher score than
expected, it can be assumed that it has broken containment and is modifying the
reward directly. This can be used as a tripwire which, when triggered, deactivates the
AI.
2.12.3 Scalable Oversight
Designers only have limited resources to monitor the actions of the AI. External
factors are inevitably forgotten about (worsening side effects) and reward functions
fail to perfectly capture what we really want (worsening reward hacking). We cannot
monitor every action taken by an AI at every moment because they operate too fast
or in a way that’s too complex for us to understand, and because the goal is often to
automate a task specifically so it can be completed without constant human oversight.
Semi-supervised learning [1] is a first step towards scalable oversight as it allows
labeled and unlabeled data to be used to train an AI. In an online learning context,
this means that the AI can learn by doing the task while only occasionally needing
feedback from a human expert. Semi-supervised learning is useful in terms of data
efficiency and is a promising avenue for creating scalable oversight for AGI.
When dealing with AGI, scalable oversight is no longer an issue of data efficiency
or human effort but of safety. At some point, the AGI will be intelligent enough
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that we are not able to tell if it is acting in our best interest or deceiving us while
actually doing something unsafe. Scalable oversight is required to make AGI safe. One
phrasing of a scalable oversight from the perspective of the AGI is “If the designers
understood what I was doing, they would approve of it.”
2.12.4 Safe Exploration
Reinforcement learning algorithms, such as epsilon-greedy and Q-learning, occasionally
take a random action as a way to explore their environments. This is effective, especially
with a small environment and a very large amount of training time, but it is not safe
for real world environments. You don’t want your robot to try driving over a cliff for
the sake of exploration. Curiosity-driven exploration is able to efficiently explore video
game environments by using an intrinsic reward function based on novelty [41]. This
provides great benefits to the learner, but can’t ensure safety. For example, the agent
only learns to avoid death because restarting the level is “boring” to it. A backup
policy which can take over when the agent is outside of safe operating conditions can
allow for safe and bounded exploration, such as an AI controlled helicopter which is
switched to a hover policy when it gets too close to the ground or travels too fast [18].
Robotics controlled by current narrow AI need to be designed to avoid damaging
expensive hardware or hurting people. Safe exploration becomes more difficult
with increased intelligence. A superintelligent AGI might kill or torture humans
to understand us better or destroy the Earth simply because such a thing has never
been done before.
2.12.5 Robustness to Distributional Change
AI that has been trained in one environment or dataset may fail when its use is greatly
different from its training. This is the cause AI obtaining good accuracy on curated
datasets but failing when put into the real world. Distributional shift can also be seen
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in the form of racial bias of some AI [24].
2.13 The Interpretation Problem
The difficulty of converting what we want into rules that can be carried out by an
AI has been named the “interpretation problem” [5]. This problem arises in domains
outside of AI, such as sports and tax law. For sports, the rules of a game are written
to reflect a best effort representation of the spirit of the game to bring out creativity
and skill in the players. The players, however, seek only to win and will sometimes
create legal tactics which “break” the game. At this point, to keep the game from
stagnating, the rules are modified to prohibit the novel game-breaking strategy. A
similar situation takes place in tax law, with friction between lawmakers and taxpayers
creating increasingly complex laws.
In AI safety, the designers knows what is and isn’t morally acceptable from their
point of view. They then design rules for the AI to abide by while seeking its objective
and craft the objective to be morally acceptable. The AI, however, only has access
to the rules and not to the human values that created them. Because of this, it will
misinterpret the rules as it pursues its objective, causing undesirable behaviour (such
as the destruction of humanity). Humans do not learn morality from a list of rules,
but from some combination of innate knowledge and lived experience. Badea et al.
suggest that the same applies to AI. Any attempt to create a set of rules to constrain
the AI to moral behaviour will fail due to the interpretation problem. Instead, we
need to figure out how we can show the AI human moral values indirectly, instead of
having to state them explicitly. Since our goals and “common sense” as applied to
any real world environment are too complex to write down without falling prey to the
interpretation problem, an alternative approach where the AI is able to acquire values
from us indirectly is required instead. Badea et al. do not provide details on how
this could be accomplished, but there are some technologies which are very similar in
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nature to the proposed value learning system. Inverse reinforcement learning [21] is
able to learn objectives from human demonstrations, and can learn goals that would
be difficult to explicitly state. Future developments in this area will be needed to
create moral AI.
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3 Classification Schema for AI Systems
To better understand an AI system and the risks that it creates, we have created a
classification schema for AI systems. We present a tag based schema similar to the one
presented in [47]. Instead of focusing on AI failures in isolation, this schema includes
both the AI and the system the AI is embedded in, allowing for detailed risk analysis
prior to failure. We pay particular attention to the orientation of the AI as both a
system with its own inherent dangers and as a component in a larger system which
depends on the AI. Any analysis attempting to divide a system into components must
acknowledge the “ambiguities, since once could argue interminably over the dividing
line between part, unit, and subsystem” [42]. The particular choice of where to draw
the line between the AI, the system, and the environment are important to making a
meaningful analysis, and requires some intuition. Because of this, our classification
system encourages repeating parts of it for different choices of dividing lines between
the AI and the system to encourage finding the most relevant framing.
To characterize the risk of an AI system, one factor is the dangers expressed by the
larger system in which the AI is a component. In an experimental setting, a genetic
algorithm hacking the simulator can be an amusing bug [32], but a similar bug making
its way into an autonomous vehicle or industrial control system would be dangerous.
Understanding the risks involved in operating the system that the AI belongs to is
critical in understanding the risk from an AI application.
The output of an AI must be connected to some means of control to be useful
within the system. This can take many forms: indirectly, with AI informing humans
who then make decisions; directly with an AI controlling the actuators of a robot
or chemical plant; or though information systems, such as a social media bot that
responds to users in real time. Any production AI system has some degree of control
over the world, and it may not be clear where the effects of the AI take place. The
connection between the output of a component (the AI) and other components is
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an instance of coupling. Because there are multiple components affected by the AI
and those components are themselves coupled with still other components, we frame
this problem in terms of the AI, which has its own properties, and a series of targets
which the AI can affect. For example, the output from an AI in a chemical plant
can be framed in numerous ways: the software signal with the computer the AI is
running in, the electrical output from the controller, the actuation of valve, the rate
of fluid flowing through the valve, or a variable in the chemical reaction taking place
downstream. Identifying the target of the AI requires context, and all of these targets
have unique consequences the might be overlooked in analyzing just one of them. The
classification schema allows for as many targets as needed when analyzing a system.
Observability of the warning signs of an accident is important as it allows for
interventions by human operators, a crucial tool in preventing accidents (“People
continuously create safety” [15]). The likelihood of timely human interventions depends
on four things:
 Time delays between AI outputs and the effects of the target.
 Observability of the system state as it is relevant to potential accidents.
 Frequency and depth of attention paid by human operators.
 Ability of operators to correct the problem once it has been identified.
The time delay between an AI creating an output and that output affecting the
target is essential to preventing accidents. Tightly coupled systems with short time
delays (such as automated stock trading) are more hazardous because the system
can go from apparent normalcy to catastrophe faster than operators can realize that
there is something wrong [30]. Observability and attention from human operators are
needed for these time delays to be an effective component of safety. As the level of
automation of a system increases, human operators become less attentive and their
understanding of its behavior decreases [6]. Reliance on automated systems decreases
an operator’s ability to regain control over a system if an accident requires manual
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control. For example, if an autonomous driving system fails, the driver, now less
familiar with driving, has to suddenly be in manual control. Together, observability,
human attention, and human ability to correct possible failures in the system all make
up a major factor in whether or not a malfunction leads to an accident.
For a given choice of target being controlled by the AI, there is maximum conceivable
amount of damage that can be done by malicious use of that target. We use the figure
as a cap as to the amount of harm possible. Most AI failures are not malicious (see
the discussion on AI Incidents in Section 2.7), so the harm done by an accident will
almost always be much less than this amount. This factor is very difficult to predict
prior to an accident. For example, imagine a component which controls cooling for a
nuclear plant. One could say the maximum damage from its malfunctioning is a lost
day of productivity because the backup cooling system will prevent any permanent
damage. Another might say loss of the entire core is possible if the backup system
also malfunctions, but the containment system is sure to keep it from harming anyone
outside. Yet another might notice that containment could also fail, and a meltdown
could harm millions of people in the surrounding area. Because of the unpredictability
of how much harm one system could do, this factor is included as a rough estimate of
the scale of power the AI has over the system and the system has over the environment.
The final criteria for classifying the nature and degree of systems risk of an AI
system are coupling, complexity of interaction, energy level, and knowledge gap.
Coupling is a measure of the AI’s interconnectivity with other components in the
system, and the strength of these connections. Loosely coupled systems have sparse
connectivity which limits the propagations of component failure into an accident, but
are also less robust. Tightly coupled systems have dense connectivity and many paths
between components, and often feedback loops that allow a component to affect itself
in complicated ways [42]. Classifying the level of coupling of the system in proximity
to the AI component can be difficult and nebulous, so only course categories (loose,
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medium, tight) are used in this analysis as finer grained considerations are likely to
become arbitrary.
Coupling considers other components and aspects of the environment that the AI
is coupled with. Examples of coupling include taking data in from another component,
transmitting data to another component, relying on the functioning of a component,
and having another component rely on the functioning of the AI. The AI component
is scored on a scale of 1-5 from loosely coupled to strongly coupled.
Complexity of interaction is a measure of how complex these interactions are.
Linear interactions are simple to understand and behavior is easy to extrapolate from
a few observations. Complex interactions have sudden non-linearities and bifurcations.
The difference is ultimately subjective, as what appears to be a complex process to an
inexperienced operator can become linear with experience and time [42]. An estimate
of complexity of the AI’s interactions within the system is made on a scale of 1-5.
Energy level is the amount of energy available to or produced by the system. Low
energy systems are systems such are battery operated devices, household appliances,
and computers. Medium energy systems include transportation systems, small factories,
and mining. High energy systems include space travel, nuclear power and some chemical
plants [42].
Knowledge gap is the gap between how well technology is understood and the scale
of its use. Technologies very early in the technological readiness scale [35] have a large
knowledge gap if used in production systems. Likewise, technologies that are very well
developed and understood can be used in production without creating a knowledge
gap, so long as appropriately trained personnel are operating them. The tendency
to have fewer and less catastrophic failures as a technology matures is due to the
decreased knowledge gap as understanding increases. Energy level and knowledge gap
together can be plotted along two axis to estimate the scale and degree of catastrophic
risk, shown in Figure 1 (figure borrowed from [48]).
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Analysis done in the field of AI safety frequently addresses dangers associated
with artificial general intelligence (AGI) and superhuman intelligence. In Section 1
we gave an cursory overview of the dangers of AGI. Certain classes of contemporary
AI failures are closely related to those that true AGI could manifest, indicating that
considerations such as containment and reward hacking are useful in analyzing AI
applications, even if the existential threat of AGI isn’t present. We also include a risk
factor for research which may lead to the development of AGI in our analysis. These
dangers are treated from an AI safety perspective as opposed to conventional safety
considerations.
Figure 1: Plotting energy level against knowledge gap to create 4 quadrants. Figure
from Shrivastava et al. [48].
The following factors are considered most significant to understanding the level
and nature of the risk of a system utilizing AI:
 The system which is affected by the outputs of the AI.
 Time delay between AI outputs and the larger system, system observability,
level of human attention, and ability of operators to correct for malfunctioning
of the AI.
 The maximum damage possible by malicious use of the systems the AI controls.
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 Coupling of the components in proximity to the AI and complexity of interactions.
 Knowledge gap of AI and other technologies used and the energy level of the
system.
Time Delay (seconds, minutes, hours, etc.)
Observability 0-5
Human Attention ((N times per day) OR (intermittent, (days,
weeks, months)))
Correctability 0-5
Table 1: Reference table for timely intervention indicators: time delay, observability,
human attention and correctability measures.
3.1 Timely Intervention Indicators
Time delay, observability, human attention, and correctability make of the four factors
for determining the ability of human operators to make a timely intervention in the
case of an accident. Time delay is how long it takes for the AI component to have a
significant effect on the target in question. Only an order of magnitude (“minutes” vs.
“hours” vs. “days”) is needed.
Observability measures how observable the internal state of the system is, how
often and with what degree of attention a human will attend to the system, and how
easy or difficult a failure of the AI component of the system is to correct once detected.
Observability is measured on a scale of 0-5, from 0 for a complete black box to 5 for
AI whose relevant inner workings can be understood trivially.
Human attention is measured as the number of hours in a day that an operator
will spend monitoring or investigating the AI component when there have not been
any signs of malfunction. If the system is not monitored regularly, then this is instead
written as the amount of time that will pass between checkups.
Correctability is the ability of an operator to manage an incident. If the AI can
be turned off without disrupting the system or if a backup system can take control
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Targets Max Damage System Accident Risk Potential Damage to Other
Parties
Target 1 $x (L, M, H) (L, M, H, C) (1, 2, 3, 4)
Target 2 $x (L, M, H) (L, M, H, C) (1, 2, 3, 4)
...
Target n $x (L, M, H) (L, M, H, C) (1, 2, 3, 4)
Table 2: Reference table for system risk factors for each target of AI control.
quickly, then correctability is high. Correctability is low when there is no alternative
to the AI and its operation is necessary to the continued functioning of the system.
Correctability is measured on a scale of 0-5, from impossible to correct to trivially
correctable.
3.2 Target of AI Control
All steps with an asterisk (*) should be repeated for each possible target. Targets
should be chosen from a wide variety of scales to achieve the best quality of analysis.
3.3 Single Component Maximum Possible Damage*
This is the amount of damage that could be done by a worse case malfunctioning of the
AI component in isolation. Since the actual worse case would be unimaginably unlikely
or require superhuman AI in control of the AI component, we instead approximate
the expected worse case by imagining a human adversary gaining control of the AI
component and attempting to do as much harm as possible. This should consider
both monetary damage, harm to people, and any other kinds of harm that could come
about in this situation.
3.4 Coupling and complexity*
Together, coupling and complexity are used to asses the risk of experiencing a systems
accident. Use Table 3 to convert coupling (high, medium, low) and interaction
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High M H C
Medium L M H
Low L L M
Table 3: Using coupling and interaction level to determine the severity of accident the
system may experience. Adapted from [48].
3.5 Energy Level and Knowledge Gap*
Energy level and knowledge gap are used together to predict the potential damage
from an accident and the degree of separation from the accident to potential victims
using Table 4. The first letter is the amount of damage (Low, Medium, High) and the
number is the degree of separation between the system and the potential victims of the
accident. First-party victims are operators, second-party victims are non-operating
personnel and system users, third party victims are unrelated bystanders, fourth party




High H3 H3 C4
Med M3 M3 H4
Low L2 L2 M4
Table 4: Using energy level and knowledge gap to determine amount of damage (Low,
Medium, High, Catastrophic) and distance to potential victims (1st party, 2nd party,
3rd party, 4th party). Adapted from [48].
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4 AI Safety Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate AI safety concerns, without being concerned about the
details of the system the AI is being used in. While no current AI systems pose
an existential threat, the possibility of a “foom”1 scenario [8] is considered seriously
as it is unknown how far we are from this points. Recent advancements (such at
GPT-3 [11]) remind us how rapidly AI capabilities can increase. In this section we
create a schema for classifying the AI itself in terms of autonomy, goal complexity,
escape potential, and anthropomorphization.
4.1 Autonomy
We present a compressed version of the autonomy scale presented in [26]. Autonomy
is as difficult to define as intelligence, but the categories and examples given in Table
5 allow for simple but coarse classification.
Autonomy Level Description Examples
Level 0 Little or no autonomy PID controller, if-statement
Level 1 Limited, well understood
optimization process
image classifier, GPT-2
Level 2 Agent with goals and








Table 5: AI autonomy levels with examples.
On level 0, the AI (or non-AI program) has little or no autonomy. The program
1The word “foom” denotes a rapid exponential increase of a single entity’s intelligence, possibly
through recursive self improvement, once a certain threshold of intelligence has been reached. It is
also called a “hard takeoff” [60].
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is explicitly designed and won’t act in unexpected ways except due to software bugs.
At level 1, an optimization process is used, but not one that has the capability of
breaking confinement. Most AI today is at this level, where it is able to perform
complex tasks but lacks any volition to do anything but transform inputs into outputs.
Level 2 is closely related to level 1, except that the addition of iterated interactions
with an environment allows for a greater degree of freedom and decision making.
Reinforcement learners and game-playing AI are in level 2, as the feedback loop of
interacting with the environment creates an embodiment more similar to that of
humans in our world. At level 3 the AI can be considered an AGI, as this level of
autonomy requires a high degree of intelligence. It can understand the agency of
others in the environment (theory of other minds) and seek to sustain and improve
itself, and seek to escape confinement.
4.2 Goal Complexity
Software that has very simple functionality (such as a thermostat) has completely
comprehensible goals, to the extent that we hardly consider them goals so much as the
system’s only functionality. More complex software may use an optimization process
to maximize some objective function (or minimize a loss function). This provides a
goal which is understandable but the goal seeking behavior of the agent may not be.
On level 0, the program doesn’t exhibit any goal directed behaviour. This is
how we typically expect software to act — it just does what it’s programmed to do.
This is not to say that software always does exactly what it’s programmed to do, as
programmers make mistakes, but that programs of this sort lack goals. At levels 1 and
2, the program has been given an objective and will search for novel ways to reach the
objectives, often creating surprising results to the programmers. The actual goal is
known, but the realization of that goal and the implicit creation of subgoals leads to






Level 0 Programs that “just run”
and have no goal seeking
behavior
conventional software
Level 1 Basic goal seeking behavior numerical optimization
Level 2 Complex goal seeking with
the ability to seek subgoals
and express reward hacking
genetic algorithm, reinforce-
ment learner
Level 3* Ability to realize
instrumental goals and
seek self improvement,
ability to hide goals
humans, AGI
Table 6: AI goal complexity with examples.
3, the program is able not only to formulate subgoals but also have instrumental goals
and the ability to intentionally obfuscate its goals. This is seen in humans, who often
obscure their motives, and in hypothetical AGI which deceive humans into thinking
their goals are aligned with ours.
4.3 Escape Potential
AI confinement is a difficult problem with many proposed measures to improve security
but no guarantees about safety [58] [4]. However, our current AI either make no
attempt to escape or lack the ability to break out of simulations. There are some
examples of real world AI breaking a layer of confinement (see Section 2.12.2), but none
that present any risk to humans or the capability establishing a persistent presence
on remote computers.
At level 0, no confinement is needed beyond standard cybersecurity measures
appropriate for the deployment environment. At levels 1 and 2, there is little risk
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Escape Potential Description Examples
Level 0 None conventional software
Level 1 The agent may find un-
expected behaviors which
technically achieve the goal
but are not desirable
genetic algorithms
Level 2 The agent intentionally seeks
to hack its environment
advanced reinforcement
learners
Level 3* The agent has the ability




Table 7: AI escape potential with examples.
of hostile escape but the agent should be monitored closely for undesirable behavior
and software exploits. The distributional shift from the simulator to the real world
provides a barrier against narrow AI affecting the real world. Because of this, agents
trained in more realistic simulators should be regarded with a greater degree of caution.
At level 3, indefinite confinement is impossible, but with robust security, at the level
of software, hardware, and social engineering, humans can benefit from a contained






Level 0 No anthropomorphization home computer, a calculator
Level 1 Some surface level appearance
of humanity (natural language
interaction, robot chassis with
human features, a name and
supposed personality)
ASIMO, robotic pets
Level 2 Level 1 but with software to




Level 3 (danger) The AI can be mistaken for a
human even with unrestricted
communication (may be text-
only, voice, or in person)
AGI
Table 8: AI anthropomorphization levels with examples.
The proliferation of humanoid, “friendly” AI products increases the degree to which
people are willing to anthropomorphize software. This leads to misconceptions about
approaches which are needed to manage existential risk and changes how researchers
conceive of AI research and AI safety research [46].
Levels 0 and 1 have been possible for a long time with minimal risks. However, the
popularization of level 2 AI has created a social climate which harbors misunderstanding
of the state of the art in AI and AI safety. While we are close to creating chatbots that
can win at the restricted Turing test, these chat bots rely on psychological tricks to
keep short-duration conversations within pre-constructed domains [14]. The creation
of level 3 AI constitutes a dissolution of the boundaries between humans and AI, and
will likely require the creation of AGI.
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5 Determining Risk Using Schema Tags
The following rules use schema tags developed in Section 3 to determine concrete
steps needed for managing the risk of deploying an AI application.
Part of the danger of tightly coupled systems is the fast communication between
nodes. On an assembly line there are at least a few seconds between one part of
the process and another, and an operator is able to see the effects of an incident,
intervening to prevent it from becoming an accident. In real time stock trading
and nuclear power plant operation, there is neither the time nor the observability
to make timely intervention reliable. Based on the significance of these factors in
interruptibility, we recommend the following: If time delay is very small and
there is poor observability or attention, then an oversight component or
monitoring protocol is recommended (unless the effects of the system are
trivial).
Identifying reliance on AI systems is also important to safety. Any AI component
is able to enter a broken state at any time, although for mature technologies this
probability is quite low. If the task being carried out by the AI is complex and a
human operator suddenly put in charge of the task when the AI fails, that operator
will lack the information and skills to carry on what the AI was doing. This issue
is discussed in depth in [6]. The higher the level of automation, the harder it is for
an operator to intervene when automation fails. Due to the intrinsic unreliability of
AI, its failure as a component should be anticipated, and a means to take it offline
and switch to a suitable backup system is needed. Thus we recommend the following
rule: If correctability is low and the system can’t be taken offline, then a
(non-AI) backup system should be implemented and maintained.
Using Table 3, the coupling and interactions of the system are used to quantify
system accident risk, as low, medium, high, or catastrophic. This is adapted
from Perrow’s interaction/coupling chart [42, p. 97]. Examples of systems with
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a combination complexity and tight coupling include chemical plants, space missions,
and nuclear power plants. Linear systems (low complexity) with tight coupling include
dams and rail transport. Examples of high complexity and loose coupling include
military expeditions and universities. Most manufacturing and single-goal agencies
are linear and have loose coupling, giving them their low risk for accidents and low
accident rate even without special precautions. The combination of complexity and
coupling makes accidents harder to predict and understand and increases the potential
for unexpected damage. Thus, we recommend the following rule: If the system
accident risk is medium or higher, then the system should be analyzed for
ways to reduce complexity around the AI component, and add centralized
control in and around that component. In other words, efforts should be made
to bring the system system toward the lower left corner of Table 3.
Table 4 provides a similar view as Table 3, but it uses energy level and knowledge
gap to characterize risk, and indicates whether the damage is limited to 1st, 2nd,
3rd, or 4th parties. 1st and 2nd parties constitute workers and operators in the same
facility as the AI so harm to them is internal to the business. Harm to 3rd parties
(people outside the business) and 4th parties (people in the future) is a much greater
ethical concern as those parties have no means to distance themself or even be aware
of the risk that is being inflicted on them. Thus, the following rule is needed to
reflect the ethical imperatives of creating significant risk to 3rd and 4th parties: If
there is significant damage possible to 3rd and 4th parties, then an ethics
committee is absolutely necessary for continued operation.
Damage potential, as determined by the adversarial thought experiments in Section
3.3, is decisive in whether or not safeguards are needed around the AI system. Systems
incapable of causing significant harm don’t require complex safety measures — most
research AI fall under this classification since they are not in control of anything
important and their outputs are only observed by scientists. However, even very
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simple AI need safeguards if they are controlling something capable of causing damage
— robotic welding equipment has multiple layers of safety to prevent injury to human
operators, not because the control system is complex but because the potential for
harm is so great. From this analysis, we provide the following recommendation:
Targets of the AI’s control which have high amounts of damage potential
should have conventional (non-AI) safeguards and human oversight.
AI safety and AI risk have only been researched seriously in the last few decades,
and most of the concerns are oriented towards the dangers of AGI. Still, some AI that
are deployed in the world today exhibit a large amount of intelligence and creativity
which provides unique dangers that traditional risk analysis does not cover. Using the
AI risk factors developed in Section 4, we make the following recommendation: If any
of the AI safety levels are level 2 or higher, then standard cybersecurity
measures should be enacted as if the AI is a weak human adversary, and
personnel education regarding AI safety hazards should be done within
the organization. An ethics board should also be created.
Furthermore, even higher degrees of intelligence are quickly becoming available.
Recent improvements in language models [11] and game-playing AI [55] have increased
AI capabilities beyond what was thought possible a decade ago. Because of this, AI
capable of attaining level 3 for any of the AI safety levels developed in Section 4 may
come sooner than expected. Since intelligent (but sub-AGI) AI will be pushed into
production usage in years to come and AI safety is far from a solved problem, we
suggest the following procedure during this gap: If any of the AI safety levels
are at or may reach level 3, then air gapping and strict protocols around
interaction with the AI should be implemented. An ethics board and
consultation with AI safety experts is required.
While many of these recommendations are adapted from theories originally intended
to manage nuclear and industrial risks, application of the risk analysis framework
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presented here is not limited to that scope. Bots and recommendation algorithms can
also classified and understood in terms of coupling and interactions. Reliance and
backup systems are applicable to the mostly digital space of contemporary AI: an
email sorting algorithm may accidentally discard useful mail, so searches should be
able to include junk mail to make recovery from such an incident easier. An AI only
able to interact on social media might seem to have no damage potential, but losses to
reputation and information quality have real world effects and need to be considered
when deciding safeguards for an AI.
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6 Case Studies
We will analyze systems that use AI in the present, historically, and from fiction under
this framework. We generate each system’s classification as presented in Section 3
and its AI safety classification as presented in Section 4 to create recommendations
on how the AI system in each case study can be improved based on the rules from
Section 5. Posthumous analysis of accidents makes it very easy to point fingers at
dangerous designs and failure by operators. However, safety is very difficult, and often
well-intentioned attempts to increase safety can make accidents more likely either
by increasing coupling and thus complexity, or increasing centralization and thus
brittleness [43]. Because of this, we will not be solely operating on hindsight to prevent
accidents that have already happened and will include systems which have yet to fail.
6.1 Roomba House Cleaning Robots
AI component: Mapping and navigation algorithm [57].
Time Delay
There is minimal delay between navigation and robot movement, likely milliseconds
or seconds.
System Observability
The system is only poorly observable. While operating, it is not possible to tell where
the Roomba will go next, where it believes it is, or where it has been unless the user
is very familiar with how it works in the context of their floor plan. Some models
include software for monitoring the robot’s internal map of the house, but it is not
likely to be checked unless something has gone wrong. However, it is very simple to
correct, as the robot can be factory reset.
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Human Attention
The user is unlikely to notice the operations of the robot except if something goes
wrong. If the robot is not cleaning properly or has gone missing, the user will likely
notice only after the problem has emerged.
Correctability
Since the robot is replaceable and manual cleaning is also an option if the robot is out
of order, correcting for any failure of the robot is simple.
6.1.1 System Targets
Target: Movement of the robot within a person’s home:
 Maximum damage: Average of a few hundred dollars per robot. Given full
control of the Roomba’s navigation, a malicious agent may succeed in knocking
over some furniture, and could also be able to destroy the Roomba by driving
it down stairs or into water. And the house would not be cleaned (denial of
service). 2
 Coupling: The robot is moderately coupled with the environment it is in, because
it is constantly sensing and mapping it. Small changes to the environment may
drastically change its path.
 Complexity: Moderate complexity, the user may not understand the path the
robot takes or how it can become trapped, but the consequences for this are
minimal.
 Energy level: The robot runs off a builtin battery and charges from a wall outlet.
It is well withing the ‘Low’ level of energy as a household appliance.
 Knowledge Gap: Low. There is minimal disparity between design and use, as the
software was designed in-house form well understood principles. Some unexpected
aspects of the environment may interact poorly with it (for example, very small
pets that could be killed by the robot). The other technologies (vacuum cleaners,
wheeled chassis robots) are also very mature and well understood, so there is no
knowledge gap for any other components. This puts it in the ‘Low’ category for
knowledge gap.
2Since the writing of this section, a Roomba-like robot has tangled itself into the hair of someone
sleeping on the floor, causing them pain and requiring help from paramedics to untangle it. This
incident exceeds the amount of harm we expected possible from such a robot [37].
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Target: Control over which areas of the floor have or have not been
vacuumed
 Maximum damage: Possible inconvenience if the floor is left dirty.
 Coupling: The cleanliness of the floor is coupled to the robot, failure of the
robot will result in the floor being unexpectedly dirty. However, this happens
over a slower time frame so it is only loosely coupled.
 Complexity: Linear, the robot works and makes the floor clean or it doesn’t and
the floor slowly gets dirty over time.
 Energy level: Low.




Human Attention intermittent, weeks
Correctability 5
Table 9: Time delay, human attention, and correctability for Roomba.
Targets Max Damage System Accident Risk Potential
Damage to
Other Parties
Robot Movement $200 M L2
Cleanliness of Floor $0 L L2
Table 10: System risks for Roomba.
6.1.3 AI Safety Concerns
The system is level 0 in all categories in Section 4. This places it within the category




Time delay is small, and the robot is often left to operate unattended. Thus if
an incident takes place (for example, the robot vacuums up a small valuable item
left on the floor), the incident may not be noticed until much later, perpetuating a
more complex accident. Some means of indicating when unusual objects have been
vacuumed would mitigate this, but would likely require a machine vision component,
greatly increasing the cost of the robot. Warning the user of these possibilities could
improve this. By including this warning, the user thinks to check the robot’s vacuum
bag when something small goes missing.
System accident risk is medium. A way to reduce complexity and increase
centralized control should be added to mitigate this. Some models include wifi
connection and a mapping and control interface, an oversight feature that is advisable
given the system properties.
6.2 HAL-9000 (Fictional)
HAL-9000 is a fictional AI from the book (and later film) 2001: A Space Odyssey [3].
Time Delay
Time delay is in the order of milliseconds. HAL-9000 is able to control all aspects of
the ship instantly.
System Observability
1. HAL-9000 can only be interacted with via a natural language interface (spoken
word) and is able to use ambiguities and falsehoods to deceive operators.
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Human Attention
Human attention is intermittent, on the scale of weeks. HAL-9000 is supposedly
perfectly safe and engineered so there is no protocol for explorative maintenance.
On-site operators only have rudimentary knowledge of HAL-9000’s workings.
Correctability
Correctability is 0. HAL-9000 is a completely black-box system, and is also very
difficult to deactivate.
6.2.1 System Targets
Target: Control of ship life support
 Maximum damage: The lives of all of the astronauts and the monetary value of
the mission (billions).
 Coupling: High, components of life support systems can suddenly become tightly
coupled (pressures interacting in different chambers etc.).
 Complexity: Moderate, possible to operate by humans or standard software.
 Energy level: Low.
 Knowledge gap: Low, life support is well understood at this level of space travel.
Target: Control of ship navigation
 Maximum damage: The lives of all of the astronauts and the monetary value of
the mission (billions).
 Coupling: Low, navigation takes a long time and maneuvers are planned well in
advance.
 Complexity: Moderate, possible to operate by humans or standard software.
 Energy level: Medium.
 Knowledge gap: Low, propulsion and navigation are well understood.
Social interactions with the crew
 Maximum damage: The moral of the crew and their trust in HAL-9000 (high
likelihood of mission failure).
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 Coupling: Medium, social interactions are usually understandable and forgiving,
but under pressure can suddenly become tightly coupled (loss of trust of some
agents, formation of cliches).
 Complexity: Complex, social interactions are naturally very complex and subtle.
 Energy level: Low
 Knowledge gap: High, humans living in close quarters with a novel AI agent




Human attention intermittent, weeks
Correctability 0
Table 11: Time delay, human attention, and correctability for HAL-9000.
Targets Max
Damage
System Accident Risk Potential
Damage To
Other Parties






Social interactions $5 billion H M4
Table 12: System risks for HAL-9000.
6.2.3 AI Safety Concerns
Autonomy: Level 2 or 3. HAL-9000 is given the same agency as any human and
attempts to prevent his own death through killing others after discovering a plot to
disconnect him.
Goal Complexity: Level 2 or 3. HAL-9000 has secret motives and creates complex
plans to meet these goals (kill the humans to prevent the success of the mission).
However, HAL-9000 does not attempt to increase his own intelligence or hack into any
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systems that he wasn’t designed to control. He also expresses the self preservation
instrumental objective.
Escape Potential: Level 2. HAL-9000 does not try to break out of any containment
(mostly because there is no containment or limiting of his controls) but he does break
protocol to try to defend himself from being shut off.
Anthropomorphization: Level 2. HAL-9000 acts “robotic” but is treated as a crew
mate and is capable of complex dialogue and meaningful thoughts.
These levels are determined post-hoc and may not reflect how HAL-9000 was
understood prior to the mission shown in the film. As understood prior to the accident,
HAL-9000 would have been thought to be less autonomous and unable to conceive
secret plots and ways to escape protocols. Thus a more fair analysis would be:
 Autonomy: Level 2
 Goal Complexity: Level 2
 Escape Potential: Level 0. He was said to be “perfectly safe” by engineers.
 Anthropomorphization: Level 1. He was treated as a control instrument, not a
person, by most.
6.2.4 Suggested Measures
HAL-9000 should have had an easier shutdown mechanism and regular monitoring
for anomalies. The guarantee that he was completely perfect (and has never made a
mistake) discouraged doubting his instructions, greatly delaying the operators from
realizing they needed to shut him off.
However, neither of these measures could have certainly prevented the accident.
One primary issue with the system was that a non-human intelligence with high
degrees of agency and poor observability (and extremely high trust by operators) was
given complete unrestricted control of all aspects of the ship.
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6.3 Microsoft’s Twitter Chatbot, Tay
Tay is a chatbot deployed by Microsoft in 2016 meant to interact with the public on
Twitter in light conversation. It failed catastrophically after being manipulated to
generate hate speech [7].
Time Delay
Tay’s outputs are created and sent within seconds.
System Observability
Tay’s observability is most likely 0 or 1, given the inability of engineers to notice the
accident, but without information internal to Microsoft this is hard to say.
Human Attention
Human attention by the operators was most likely constant but not sufficient to read
every comment made by the AI.
Correctability
Correctability is 2. The project was taken offline permanently after an incident, but
the product was only a demonstration so there were no practical costs of deactivating
it.
6.3.1 System Targets
Target: Creation of Tweets
 Maximum Damage: Loss of reputation by creating hate speech
 Coupling: High, interactions on a social network are highly coupled.
 Complexity: High, social interactions are highly complex.
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 Energy level: Low, no physical effects (beside data transmissions) are created
by the AI.
 Knowledge Gap: Medium, large scale deployment of a chatbot has only been






Table 13: Time delay, human attention, and correctability for Microsoft’s Twitter
chatbot, Tay.
Targets Max Damage System Accident Risk Potential
Damage to
Other Parties
Tweet creation Reputation loss C L2
Table 14: System risks for Microsoft’s Twitter chatbot, Tay.
6.3.3 AI Safety Concerns
Autonomy: Level 2, Tay was allowed to interact with users freely and was able to
learn speech patterns from them.
Goal Complexity: Level 1, Tay did not have complex goal seeking behaviour but
does use some form of optimization to choose what to say.
Escape Potential: Level 0. Tay is unable to do anything besides produce text in a
social setting.
Anthropomorphization: Level 2. Tay is intentionally created to sound like a
relatable young person, and is treated as a person by many. Furthermore, social
engineering techniques designed for humans, such as indoctrination, were used
successfully by internet users on Tay.
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 Autonomy: Level 2
 Goal Complexity: Level 1
 Escape Potential: Level 0
 Anthropomorphization: level 2
6.3.4 Suggested Measures
The short time delay and lack of observability indicates that oversight is needed. Given
the monetary scale of the project, having a human check each Tweet before sending it
would have prevented this incident from reaching the public.
The system accident risk is high (given the complexity and coupling of social
networks). Means of reducing complexity should be sought out. This is difficult due
to these factors being inherent to social networks, but a human-in-the-loop can make
the complexity manageable, as social interactions are more linear for skilled humans.
The damage potential is high. Tay did in fact create hate speech and damage
Microsoft’s reputation. Tay did have safeguards (scripted responses for controversial
topics) but not enough human oversight to notice the creation of hate speech before
the public did.
Tay’s autonomy was level 2, indicating that an ethics board should be consulted
for making policy decisions. This could have allowed the foresight to prevent the “PR
nightmare” that occurred after Tay’s deployment.
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7 Conclusion
By synthesising accident and organizational theories with AI safety in the context
of contemporary AI accidents, we have created a framework for understanding AI
systems and suggesting measures to reduce risks from these systems. Using examples
from household and social technology, as well as a fictional example, we have shown
the flexibility of our framework to capture the risks of an AI application. We believe
the classification framework and our guidelines for extracting practical measures from
it are successful at striking a balance between being excessively rigid (which would
make its use difficult and brittle) and overly subjective (which would render the
framework useless). Application to real world systems and cases of applying our
suggested measures to real world problems would further this work, providing insight
into how our framework is and isn’t helpful in practice.
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 System accident: An accident in a system with high complexity and tight
coupling caused by complex interactions between system components. They are
often incomprehensible to operators [43].
 AI Safety: The field concerned with handling existential threat from AI. It can
also refer to research on improving safety of AI in the context of social and
industrial applications that do not pose an existential risk.
 AI Risk: Existential risk from AI.
 Normal accident: Synonym for Systems Accident. “Normal” here refers to the
inevitability of the accident from the system’s functioning often despite best
efforts to avoid an accident.
 Tight coupling: Two components are tightly coupled if one depends on the other,
especially if this dependence happens on a very short time scale.
 Loose coupling: Two components are loosely coupled if one depends on the other
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